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Despite a commonsense view that vision 
provides a veridical window onto the world 
around us, a growing body of scientiﬁ  c evi-
dence suggests a more complicated account. 
Imagine walking down a dark alley and 
catching a glimpse of a shadowy object. In 
a sedate neighbourhood you might dismiss 
it as harmless and inanimate; in a neigh-
bourhood of ill repute you might interpret 
it as a potential attacker. This shift in cat-
egorisation reﬂ  ects both the impoverished 
nature of sensory input coupled with the 
greater danger associated with your altered 
surroundings. An emerging consensus 
holds that perceptual decision processes are 
dynamically shaped by both prior expec-
tations and the salience of objects in the 
environment. Indeed, to solve the problem 
of perceptual inference, it has long been 
known that a top-down, or “generative” 
model of the world is computationally 
crucial (Helmholtz, 1856).
Since the application of signal detec-
tion theory (SDT) to psychology in the 
1950s, it has been clear that categorical 
decisions, including simple sensory judge-
ments, necessitate decision thresholds 
(Green and Swets, 1966). These thresholds 
provide a means to splice up noisy sensory 
input and recover the most likely causes 
in the environment. The relatively simple 
solution provided by SDT is that a decision 
criterion is applied to the ﬁ  xed, unchang-
ing sensory evidence on any given trial. 
Any changes to this criterion, for instance 
the inﬂ  uences of prior expectations and 
rewards, are said to occur downstream 
of the accumulation of sensory evidence. 
However, while this theoretical dissocia-
tion between the compilation of evidence 
and incorporation of utility is inherent to 
SDT (and several more complex models 
of perception), there is no a priori reason 
to expect that the neural implementation 
reﬂ  ects such a division of labour. Thus, 
the issue of where stimulus value exerts 
its effects within the sensorimotor trans-
form remains an unresolved empirical 
question.
In a recent report, Liston and Stone 
(2008) set out to resolve this theoretical 
debate with an elegant psychophysical 
analysis of human observers’ behaviour. 
At the start of each trial, they asked par-
ticipants to make a rapid eye movement 
(saccade) to the brighter of two disks pres-
ented on a noisy background. Changes in 
the probability of reward at each target 
location produced systematic biases in the 
number of saccades towards the leftward or 
rightward target, which could have arisen 
at any stage in the decision pathway. The 
crucial part of the experiment involved 
immediately asking for a second judge-
ment, in which the brightness of a new 
test stimulus had to be compared with the 
recently chosen target.
The authors reasoned that if value biases 
the incoming sensory evidence, then this 
will also scale the subsequent basis against 
which the test stimulus is compared, leading 
to a polarisation of the psychometric curves 
for brightness (note, however, that the des-
ignation of the ﬁ  rst decision as “motor” 
and the second “perceptual” is somewhat 
arbitrary: both required a brightness judge-
ment followed by a motor response, albeit 
an unspeeded mouse click in the latter case). 
If sensory noise is also scaled along with 
the signal, then the slope of these psycho-
metric functions (a measure of variability) 
and their shift will be correlated. Across 
all observers, the latter prediction was 
most consistent with the data. There was a 
strong correlation between the magnitude 
of brightness changes induced by the sac-
cadic bias, and the variability in this judge-
ment. In other words, at the more rewarded 
location, judgements were both brighter 
and noisier. Furthermore, these perceptual 
changes were correlated with the extent of 
the bias in the ﬁ  rst decision phase. Together, 
this evidence indicates that the saccadic bias 
is not purely motor, but instead ampliﬁ  es 
both the signal and noise carried over into 
a subsequent brightness comparison.
A possible neural basis for the results 
reported by Liston and Stone (2008) can 
be found in a recent functional magnetic 
resonance imaging study. Serences (2008) 
found that spatially selective activity in 
visual cortex (V1, V2, V4 and intraparietal 
sulcus) was systematically modulated by 
the reward probability associated with a 
particular target, possibly via attentional 
control mechanisms, despite the task not 
containing an overt perceptual compo-
nent. Interestingly, this modulation was 
not driven by the self-reported value of 
the targets, suggesting the inﬂ  uences of 
spatial value on low-level visual processes 
are tracked unconsciously. Asymmetric 
changes in spatially selective visual cortex 
are consistent with the ﬁ  ndings of Liston 
and Stone (2008), where stimulus value 
modulated both sensory signal and noise 
in a spatially dependent fashion. Indeed, 
if we assume that basic neural codes fol-
low a Poisson form (Ma et al., 2008) then 
ampliﬁ  cation by value will naturally lead to 
a scaling of both posterior mean and vari-
ance, matching the psychophysical results. 
It remains unclear at what stage in the 
perceptual decision pathway value-based 
changes would be observed when the value 
of a stimulus is deﬁ  ned by identity, and not 
by spatial location.
More generally, the results of Liston and 
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here point out the limitations of a simple 
SDT approach for understanding biases in 
decision processes. Despite its empirical 
successes, SDT incorporates the implicit 
assumption that representation of sensory 
evidence and the formation of the deci-
sion are discrete, serial processes. By con-
trast, by using thoughtful psychophysical 
logic, Liston and Stone (2008) show how 
the inﬂ  uence of value on the perceptual 
decision process is subtle, altering an inter-
mediate representation in the ﬂ  ow from 
sensation to action. Combining such careful 
psychophysics with neural data such as that 
reported by Serences (2008) will prove cru-
cial in understanding how the brain adjusts 
attention and perceptual   categorisation to 
optimally sample the environment, and 
how these changes ultimately shape what 
we see.
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